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TORTS: SOVEREIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY IN NEW MEXICO
RUTH L. KOVNAT*

Ordinarily, if a person employed to perform services for the
benefit of another is subject to a right of control by his employer,
the employer is liable for the injury which the employee negligently'
or even intentionally 2 causes within the scope of his employment.3
The vicarious liability of the employer for the torts of his employees
rests on the principle that if the employer reaps the benefit of the
conduct of his employee, he as well as the careless employee should
be financially responsible for injuries to innocent third parties resulting from the negligent performance of such acts.4
If, however, the employer is the state, its agency, or a political
subdivision whose employee is engaged in a governmental activity,'
it is not liable for the torts of its employees, since the doctrine of
sovereign immunity protects it from being sued without its consent.
Whatever the historical basis for the protection of the sovereign from
suit,6 it seems clear that the ready judicial acceptance of the im*Associate Professor of Law, UNM School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Bailey v. Jeffries-Eaves, Inc., 76 N.M. 278, 414 P.2d 503 (1966). Accord,
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 243 (1957); See also, Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ § 219, 220 (1957); Wtite Auto Stores v. Reyes, 223 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1955); Romero
v. Shelton, 70 N.M. 425, 374 P.2d 301 (1962).
2. McCauley v. Ray, 80 N.M. 171, 453 P.2d 192 (1968). See also Restatement (Second)
of Agency § § 244-249 (1957).
3. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1957).
4. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mraz, 255 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1958), Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co.,
124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 50 Cal. App.3d 608 (1975).
5. The paradigm of a political subdivision is the municipal corporation which is regarded
as a dualistic entity. On one hand, it possesses governmental powers, and on the other hand
it is a corporate body, providing services, often for a fee, that might be as well provided by
another sort of corporation. When an agent of a municipal corporation tortiously performs
an act in the governmental capacity of the municipality, the municipality is protected from
suit by sovereign immunity. If the agent's tort occurs during the performance of a corporate
or proprietary activity, the municipality is in the same position as any other corporation
would be; hence, it is not immune. See Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations,4
Ill. L.Q. 28, 1921; Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41, 1949. See also
Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 476 P.2d 60 (1970); Merrill v. City of
Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 332 A.2d 378 (1974).
6. See 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 458-69 (5th ed., 1942) suggesting that
"the King can do no wrong," for he is the "fountain of justice," is the common law source
of the doctrine. In neither Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 737 (1824), nor Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), does Chief Justice Marshall question the premise that a
State or the United States cannot be sued without its consent.
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munity in the United States and its preservation into the twentieth
century is substantially based on reluctance to permit invasion of the
public coffers from the satisfaction of liability judgments7 instead of
for the public purposes for which they were appropriated.
Furthermore, the individual who is injured may not have a claim
against the public employee whose conduct injured him either,
because if the employee is engaged in a discretionary activity within
the scope of his duty, he is also immune from suit 8 on the grounds
that fear of liability for his actions might chill him in the exercise of
his official duties and rebound ultimately to the public detriment.9
It is clear, then, that the victim of the tortious conduct of a public
official or employee is in a far worse position to shift and spread his
loss than is the victim of the tortious conduct of anyone else. Absent
a grant of legislative consent or a judicial reconsideration of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, he certainly will be barred from
suing the employer and, in some instances, from suing the employee
as well. This disparity of treatment between victims' 0 and the avail7. It is generally agreed that the historical roots of governmental immunity as distinguished from sovereign immunity are in Rossell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep.
359 (1788). See, e.g., W. Prosser, Torts 978 (4th ed. 1971), Stason, Governmental Tort
Liability Symposium, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1321 (1954), Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924). The court in that case extended immunity to an
unincorporated county, influenced by the lack of a fund "out of which satisfaction is to be
made." See also Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 504, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
8. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), Adams v. Tatsch, 68 N.M. 446, 362 P.2d 984
(1961). See Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 Col. L.
Rev. 722 (1947).
9. There are, of course, limitations on the immunity even of discretionary employees
acting within the scope of their duties. The most prominent limitation is contained within
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." When a state officer acts under state law in a way which violates the
federal constitution, he comes into conflict with the supreme law of the United States and is
stripped of his official character. In such a case, a state has no power to grant him any
immunity from responsibility under the federal constitution. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974).
10. The argument that the doctrine of sovereign immunity arbitrarily and unreasonably
creates two classes of plaintiffs and thus violates the guarantee of "equal protection of the
laws" has been made. The question has never been presented to the Supreme Court of New
Mexico and was specifically rejected by the Court of Appeals in Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 88 N.M. 180, 538 P.2d 1202 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Ohio which might have squarely raised the
question. Krause v. Ohio, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972). The Ohio Court of Appeals had held that
sovereign immunity conflicts with the fourteenth amendment, 28 Ohio App.2d 1, 274
N.E.2d 321 (1971). The case was reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court, 31 Ohio St.2d 132,
285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), on the grounds that substantive differences justify the special
treatment of states and their political subdivisions. In Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 217
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ability of liability insurance to protect the fiscal integrity of governments has caused modern courts and legislatures to reconsider the
traditional approach to immunity.
In New Mexico the liability of the State, its agencies, and its
political subdivisions has received the attention of two successive
legislative sessions and the state Supreme Court during the span of a
calendar year. The second legislative effort, The Torts Claims Act,' 1
is a direct response to Hicks v. State,' 2 in which the New Mexico
Supreme Court abolished the common law rule that no sovereign
state can be sued in its own courts without its consent and permission. Since such volatile activity may suggest uncertainty of
policy, this article will develop an understanding of New Mexico's
present position on governmental immunity and that of public
employees or officials.
SOVEREIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY BEFORE 1975

Prior to 1975 the New Mexico law on sovereign and governmental
immunity was contained in several legislative acts as well as in a
number of judicial decisions."' The common law in New Mexico was
Kan. 279, 540 P.2d 66 (1975), a statute conferring immunity on the state, its boards,
commissions, departments, agencies, etc. from liability and suit on implied contract, or for
negligence or any other tort was found to be in conflict with the equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment and of the Kansas constitution becuase it conferred full
immunity on the state irrespective of the nature of the activity. Cities, on the other hand,
are not immune for tortious conduct occuring in the course of proprietary activities. Persons
injured are thus classified by the type of governmental entity involved. The court could find
no practical or important distinctions to justify the classification, and so found it arbitrary,
discriminatory and unreasonable. See also Hunter v. North Mason High School & School
Dist., 85 Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975), which held that a statutory provision which
required that notice of claim be made to a school district within a time period shorter than
that required by the applicable statute of limitations as a condition precedent to filing a
claim in the district court offended equal protection guarantees. Accord, Reich v. State
Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510
P.2d 879 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1974).
11. Laws 1976, Chapter 58, § § 1 through 19, eff. July 1, 1976.
12. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975), rehearing88 N.M.
,544 P.2d 1158 (1976).
13. As to the State, see Nevares v. State Armory Bd., 81 N.M. 268, 466 P.2d 114 (1969);
State v. Burks, 75 N.M. 19, 399 P.2d 920 (1965); State v. Town of Grants, 69 N.M. 145,
364 P.2d 853 (1961); Maes v. Old Lincoln County Memorial Comm'n, 64 N.M. 475, 330
P.2d 556 (1958); Livingston v. Regents of N.M. College of Agriculture & Medical Arts, 64
N.M. 306, 328 P.2d 78 (1958); Swayze v. Bartlett, 58 N.M. 504, 273 P.2d 367 (1954); Day
v. Penitentiary of N.M., 58 N.M. 391, 271 P.2d 831 (1954); Hathaway v. New Mexico State
Police, 57 N.M. 747 (on rehearing 758), 263 P.2d 690 (1953); Vigil v. Penitentiary of N.M.,
52 N.M. 224, 195 P.2d 1014 (1948); Arnold v. State, 48 N.M. 596, 154 P.2d 257 (1944);
New Mexico State Highway Dep't v. Bible, 38 N.M. 372, 34 P.2d 295 (1934); Dougherty v.
Vidal, 37 N.M. 256, 21 P.2d 90 (1933); State ex rel. Evans v. Field, 27 N.M. 384, 201 P.
1059 (1921). See also McWhorter v. Board of Educ., 63 N.M. 421; 320 P.2d 1025 (1958);
State ex rel. Del Curto v. District Ct., 51 N.M. 297, 183 P.2d 607 (1947); American Trust &
Say. Bank v. Scobee, 29 N.M. 436, 224 P. 788 (1924); Locke v. Trustees of N.M. Reform
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summarized by Justice Oman in 1973 in Sangre de Cristo Development Corp. Inc. v. City of Santa Fe," 4 in which the defendants were
the City of Santa Fe and the Board of County Commissioners of

Santa Fe County:
Regardless of what may be the law in other states, this Court has
consistently held the State of New Mexico may not be sued in its
courts without its permission or consent. (citations omitted). Also in
New Mexico, municipalities ... are clothed with this immunity from
suit, insofar as their governmental functions are concerned. II
It was thus expressly recognized that municipalities were clothed
with immunity only to the extent that the activity in question was

governmental rather than proprietary. Such activities as operation of
a municipal swimming pool in a public park,"6 construction and
repair of sewers and sewage plants,' ' and construction and maintenance of streets to avoid defects and obstructions' 8 were characterized as proprietary functions of municipalities, whereas activities
2
such as operation of a police department," 9 a county hospital, 0 and
2
a firefighting service,' ' installation of stopsigns, 2 and maintenance
of roads, 2 had all been held to be governmental activities, immunizing the municipality from liability despite an allegation of negligence.
The legislative grant of consent to sue the state was limited. The
earliest statute on the subject, 2" enacted in 1941 and repealed in
authorized the state Board of Finance to require the pur1975,2
chase of liability and property damage insurance to protect against
loss which occurred because of negligent operation of motor vehicles
by employees of the state, its agencies or political subdivisions in the
course of their employment. It preserved the common law bar
School, 23 N.M. 487, 169 P. 304 (1917). As to municipal corporations, see Montoya v. City
of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 476 P.2d 60 (1970); Hammell v. City of Albuquerque, 63
N.M. 374, 320 P.2d 384 (1958). See also McWhorter v. Bd. of Educ., supra; Barker v. City
of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943). As to counties, see Elliott v. Lea County, 58
N.M. 147, 267 P.2d 131 (1954); Murray v. Board of Comm'rs, 28 N.M. 309, 210 P. 1067
(1922).
14. 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323, cert. denied 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
15. 84 N.M. 343, 346-347, 503 P.2d 323, 326-327, cert. denied 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
16. Latimer v. City of Clovis, 83 N.M. 610, 495 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1972).
17. Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943).
18. Primus v. City of Hot Springs, 57 N.M. 190, 256 P.2d 1065 (1953).
19. Barnett v. Cal M, Inc., 79 N.M. 553, 445 P.2d 974 (1968).
20. Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hosp., 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963).
21. Gilbert v. New Mexico Constr. Co., 39 N.M. 216, 44 P.2d 489 (1935), Andrade v.
City of Albuquerque, 74 N.M. 534, 395 P.2d 597 (1964).
22. Hammell v. City of Albuquerque, 63 N.M. 374, 320 P.2d 384 (1958).
23. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 88 N.M. 180, 538 P.2d 1202
(1975).
24. Laws 1941, Ch. 192, § § 1, 2; N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 64-25-8 and -9 (1953).
25. Laws 1975, Ch. 334, § 18.
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against suing the state and provided instead that the action should be
brought against the allegedly negligent state employee. The insurer
was prohibited from raising the defense of sovereign immunity to
any claim covered by the policy, and the claimant was required to
waive any portion of his claim in excess of the liability limit stated in
the policy. The statute was construed so that municipal corporations
were included as political subdivisions of the state and so protected
by the terms of the statute.2 6
It is unclear, however, whether the statute could properly have
been construed to obliterate the proprietary-governmental distinction previously developed by the courts. If so, actions against
municipalities would have been barred for injuries resulting from
negligent operation of motor vehicles in the performance of proprietary functions even though such actions would have been
permitted under common law. Such an interpretation is inconsistent
with the legislative intent to protect the public against injury
expressed in the statute. Furthermore, the silence of the legislature as
to the common law distinction would seem to have compelled the
conclusion that the common law remained unchanged.
A 1959 statute, also repealed in 1975,27 permitted recovery of
damages for death, personal injury, or property damage resulting
from either the employer's or the employee's negligence occurring
during the course of employment for the state, county, city, school
districts, and other state agencies and institutions. The statute
authorized purchase of liability insurance covering public employees
for harm caused by their negligence during the course of their
service. It also authorized the purchase of insurance against liability
for damages resulting from false arrest or false imprisonment.
Consent to sue the state and its agencies was granted. No judgment
could run against the state, however, unless there was liability
insurance to cover the amount and cost of such judgment. The legislative pattern was consistent with the purpose of protecting the fiscal
integrity of the public agency from the inroads of liability judgments. In this act too the legislature was silent as to a distinction
between governmental and proprietary activities.
The relationship between the 1941 and 1959 statutes was considered by the Supreme Court in Galvan v. City of Albuquerque,2 8
in which suit for personal injuries was brought against the City of
Albuquerque for the negligent operation of one of its motor vehicles
by a city employee. The plaintiff proceeded under the 1959 statute,
26. City of Albuquerque v. Campbell, 68 N.M. 75, 358 P.2d 698 (1960).
27. Laws 1959, Ch. 333; N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 5-6-18 to -22 (Repl. 1966).
28. 87 N.M. 235, 531 P.2d 1208 (1975).

NEW MEXICO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 6

which permitted actions to be brought against the state and subdivisions, and the city moved to dismiss on the ground that it was
immune from suit under the earlier statute, relying on the provision
that only suit against the operator of the vehicle was permitted. The
district court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. Finding the two statutes irreconcilable, the Supreme Court,
through Justice Stephenson, ruled that the later statute was so broad,
clear and explicit that it showed a legislative intent to repeal the
earlier statute. It remanded to the district court with directions to
reinstate the city as defendant.
In interpreting the 1959 statute to be so broad as to repeal by
implication the 1941 statute, the court expressly indicated its displeasure with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court considered the 1959 statute to go further in restricting the operation of
the doctrine than did the 1941 statute in that it permitted an action
to be brought against the state or a political subdivision. 2 9
PUBLIC OFFICER IMMUNITY BEFORE 1975
The legislature had not been silent on the question of the personal
liability of a public officer either. In a section of the Municipal Code

enacted in 1965" and repealed in 1975, personal actions were
barred against any officer of a municipality for tortious acts done
under authority of the municipality or in execution of its orders. The
municipality was instead responsible. By limiting the bar to members
or officers of municipalities 3 1 the legislature seemed to preserve the
distinction developed at common law between employees typically
performing discretionary acts and those typically performing ministerial acts. 3 2 At common law if an officer were at a sufficiently high
policymaking level, he was immune from suit for injuries caused by
his discretionary activities to avoid "dampen [ing] the ardor of all but
29. Such an interpretation of the 1959 statute may be considered technical, since the
effect of both statutes is to permit an action if the municipality has purchased insurance to
cover the risk and to limit recovery to the value of the insurance. The difference consists
merely in whether the city is a proper defendant. If insurance has not been purchased by the
municipality to cover the risk of negligent driving of municipal employees, action may not
be brought against the municipality, irrespective of which statute is deemed to apply. The
common law action against the individual tortfeasor is still available to the victim, but he
probably has a judgment proof defendant.
30. Laws 1965, Ch. 300; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-9-7 (1953), derived from N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 14-17-11 (1953).
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-9-1 (Repl. 1968).
32. The predecessor statute had been employed to bar actions against police officers.
Taylor v. City of Roswell, 48 N.M. 209, 147 P.2d 814 (1944). But see Rascoe v. Farmington, 62 N.M. 51, 304 P.2d 575 (1956), where the court assumed that city employees who
filled an irrigation ditch would be protected from suit. This hardly seems a discretionary act.
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the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching
discharge of their duties "'3 a which would result if the officer feared
liability actions in the event his judgment miscarried and resulted in
injury. While preserving the common law protection of officers, the
legislature seemed to relinquish the common law immunity of its
municipalities, at least as to their governmental activities, by declaring that a municipality was responsible in all cases where the officer's
suit was barred. Predecessor legislation 3 4 containing substantially
36
3
identical language was so construed. 1 However, most cases
interpreting this statute and predecessor legislation decided in favor
of the municipality on the ground that the complained of conduct
was not authorized by the city. The consequence of such a finding
was to immunize the municipality and reinstate the personal liability
of the public officer. Accordingly, the meaning of the legislation on
the scope of the municipality's liability to victims of tortious acts of
public officers has never been clear.
In an analogous provision 3 1 the legislature barred personal actions
against any employee of the New Mexico State Police for any tort
done under authority of the state, but the liability of the state was
limited to the extent of liability insurance coverage. No such limitation was placed on the municipality's liability for the torts of its
officers or members.
Finally in the Peace Officers Liability Act 3 8 the legislature
attempted to address systematically the problem of injury inflicted
by peace officers during the performance of their duties. It was a
necessary effort because by this time the legislature had apparently
modified the common law rule that if a peace officer injured someone by an act within the scope of his duties, the state would be
immune on grounds of sovereign immunity and the municipality
would be immune on grounds that police work is governmental, but
that in both cases the officer would be personally liable. The two
statutes discussed above eliminated the personal liability of the
officer if he acted under authority of his employer, the state police
33. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (1949), quoted with approval in Adams v.
Tatch, 68 N.M. 446, 454, 362 P.2d 984, 990 (1961).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-1611 (1941).
35. Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952). This case involved
prosecution, an arguably governmental activity.
36. Taylor v. City of Roswell, 48 N.M. 209, 147 P.2d 814 (1944), Cherry v. Williams, 60
N.M. 93, 287 P.2d 987 (1955), Valdez v. City of Las Vegas, 68 N.M. 304, 361 P.2d 613
(1961), Salazar v. Bernalillo County, 62 N.M. 199, 307 P.2d 186 (1956).
37. Laws 1971, Ch. 269, § 1; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-27(1) (Repl. 1972), repealed in
1976.
38. Laws 1973, Ch. 194, § 1; N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 39-8-1 through 17 (Supp. 1975).
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or municipality. Under the Municipal Code Section the municipal
peace officer was immune from suit, and the municipality liable to
the extent of proved damage. 3 9
The provisions of the 1959 act overlapped the municipal code
section, however. If the offensive act of the municipal peace officer
consisted of negligence or false arrest or imprisonment and the 1959
act were applied, the liability of the municipality would be limited
4
by the extent of its liability insurance, if any. " The relationship
between the statute barring suit against the municipal officer and the
statute consenting to suit against the city but limiting recovery to
4
liability insurance has never squarely come before the court. 1 If the
peace officer were a state police employee, it seems clear that the
state's liability would be limited by the existence of liability insurance.
In Montoya v. City of Albuquerque,4 2 the Supreme Court substantially limited the potential reach of the Municipal Code in imposing liability on the municipality. It affirmed a dismissal of a complaint against the City of Albuquerque on grounds that municipal
officers' suits were barred and the city liable only when the governing body or its authorized agents specifically directed the municipal
officer to do the complained of act and not when the complained of
act occurred in the performance of his general duties. The consequence of that interpretation of the Municipal Code was that the
victim of municipal officers' torts neither had a remedy against the
municipality in the majority of cases nor was the municipal officer
protected from suit. To remedy that result, the legislature in 1973
enacted the Peace Officers Liability Act, 4 3 which provided a means
for the state or local public body to protect peace officers from
liability and at the same time compensate the individuals wrongfully
harmed by the officer's actions.
Although no state agency or local public body was required to
subject itself to liability under the Peace Officers Liability Act, it
might do so either by purchasing liability insurance up to maximum
limits or by filing a notice of election with both the Superintendent
suit and
39. It is remarkable that N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-9-7, which barred the officer's
extent
imposed liability on the municipality did not limit the municipality's liability to the
of liability insurance coverage.
40. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
summary
41. In Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 476 P.2d 60 (1970),
judgment for the city was affirmed. Plaintiff alleged that four police officers committed
Since the
false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and assault and battery.
city had no insurance, the court did not consider the 1959 statute to be applicable.
42. Id.
43. Laws 1973, Ch. 194, § 1-17; N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 39-8-1 through -17 (1953).
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of Insurance and the Department of Finance and Administration.
The notice indicated the governmental entity's waiver of immunity
and had to be approved by the Department of Finance and Administration. Approval might be conditional on the purchase of insurance if
in the judgment of the Department the governmental entity was
insufficiently solvent to be a self-insurer.4 4
The waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity was permitted
for any bodily injury caused by a peace officer acting within the
scope of his duties as well as personal injuries arising from false
arrest, false imprisonment, erroneous service of civil papers, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, defamation, violation of property
rights and civil rights. 4" Immunity was not waived under this statute
where liability arose out of fraud with affirmative dishonesty, operation of a motor vehicle, watercraft or aircraft, or willful violation of
a penal statute. 46 Although the statute was directed toward elimination of the personal liability of the officer for the statutory injuries
and imposed the duty to defend the officer on the state or local
public body, it did not expressly bar suit against the officer, nor
provide for his indemnification if a judgment was entered against
him.
THE PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES LIABILITY ACT
The legislature in 1975 passed the short-lived Public Officers and
Employees Liability Act,4
the stated legislative purpose of which
was to "modify the common law doctrines of sovereign immunity by
providing a permissive method whereby the state or local public
body may elect to protect itself and its officers and employees from
personal liability arising out of certain acts committed during the
performance of governmental and proprietary activities and to
4 8
compensate the individuals wrongfully harmed by these actions."
The legislature repealed the legislation considered in Galvan v. City
of Albuquerque and also that portion of the Municipal Code that
barred suit against a municipal officer but let stand the Peace
Officers Liability Act.
For the first time the legislature purported to deal with compensation of injuries caused by acts of municipal employees in performance of proprietary activities. At common law, if an activity is in
furtherance of corporate or proprietary, as distinguished from
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

N.M. Stat. Ann.
N.M. Stat. Ann.
N.M. Stat. Ann.
Laws 1975, Ch.
N.M. Stat. Ann.

§ 39-8-8C (Supp. 1975).
§ 39-8-2 and -3 (Supp. 1975).
§ 39-8-13 (Supp. 1975).
334, § 1-17; N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 5-13-1 through -17 (Supp. 1975).
§ 5-13-2 (Supp. 1975).
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governmental, goals the liability of the municipality is determined in
the same manner as is that of any other corporation. Ordinary rules
of vicarious liability apply. Municipalities were expressly included
within the coverage of the Act. 4 9 Governmental entities might but
were not required to waive immunity as to all of their activities, both
proprietary and governmental, by either purchasing insurance or
filing a notice of election of waiver of immunity. If a municipality
did not waive immunity by either of these means, it was immune
from liability as to a proprietary activity, even though it might have
been liable under ordinary common law rules. Despite the admitted
difficulty in ascertaining whether a particular activity is governmental or proprietary and the triviality of differences upon which
the distinctions are made,' 0 this narrowing of right to compensation
to persons injured through wrongful acts of public employees is
inconsistent with a general legislative purpose of expanding compensation to such persons.
But it is not at all clear that the legislature did intend to expand
compensation opportunities for victims of the acts of public employees. In at least two areas the legislative purpose of expanding
relief does seem clear: as to the wrongful acts of public employees of
the state and its agencies and as to the public employees of "local
public bodies" performing governmental activities. Under prior law
the grant of authority to purchase insurance to cover liability went
only to injuries resulting from negligence, false arrest or false imprisonment. And suits could be brought against the state, county,
city, etc. only for the negligence of public officers' 1 with judgment
running only to the extent of liability insurance. The 1975 act
expanded the covered risks to include injuries such as false arrest,
false imprisonment, erroneous service of civil papers, malicious protection, libel, slander, and violation of civil rights.' 2 The act also
permitted waiver of sovereign immunity other than by purchase of
insurance by filing a notice of election of waiver, so that judgment
was theoretically possible against a state agency or local public body
even in the absence of insurance.5 3
In other respects, however, the legislation limited liability even
when the waiver was exercised. Under prior law, at least as to negligence, if a state agency, city, county, etc. purchased liability
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-13-3B (Supp. 1975). "Local public body" means all political
subdivisions of the state, and their agencies, instrumentalities and institutions.
50. See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
51. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
52. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-13-3D (Supp. 1975).
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-13-8B (Supp. 1975).
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insurance, the amount of recovery possible against the state, city, or
county was limited to the extent of the coverage provided.5 4 Under
the 1975 law if an agency or local public body elected to purchase
liability insurance to cover the expanded list of risks, its liability
would nevertheless not exceed $100,000 for death or $200,000 in
any other case or $1,000,000 for any number of claims arising out of
a single occurrence. 5 s Furthermore any state or local public body
had the authority to establish its actual limits of liability at levels
lower than those set forth above. 6
The vice of the Public Officers and Employees Liability Act,
however, is the permissive waiver it provided. Quite simply, agencies
and local public bodies were not required to waive their immunity. The
acts of a public employee resulting in injury gave rise to liability of
the state or local public body only if the employer agency had
waived its immunity, whereas the very same acts of a similarly
situated employee would not if his employer agency had not elected
to waive its immunity. If the doctrine of sovereign immunity is at
least partially explained by the perceived need to protect the public
treasuries from dissipation in the payment of tort judgments, that
purpose may have been well served by this statute. An agency with
great exposure could avoid liability completely. But the inequities
inherent in the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
were exaggerated in the Act. The remedies available to the victim of
tortious conduct turned not on the nature of the conduct and not
even on a general concern for protection of the public treasury, but
on the vagaries of choice of scores of state agencies and local public
bodies.
In 1975 the Supreme Court was faced with Hicks v. State,"'
which squarely raised the question of the continued vitality of the
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 5-6-18 through -22 (Repl. 1974). See text accompanying notes
25 and 26 supra.
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-13-5A (Supp. 1975).
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-13-5B (Supp. 1975). Another possible limitation in the 1975
law involves the legislative definition of an act within the scope of duties. Under the
common law and presumably under prior legislation, except the Municipal Code section
repealed by this act, an act within the scope of duties included acts within the apparent
authority of the employer or officer. Section 5-13-4B of the 1975 law sets out the circumstances under which an officer shall be deemed to be within the scope of his duties:
(1) when he is engaged in the immediate and actual performance of any duties
which he is aithorized to perform;
(2) when he is engaged in the immediate and actual performance of any duties
which he is requested to perform by any governmental entity or agency
whether or not his emplyer.
Unless "authorized to perform" is interpreted to include apparent authority as well as actual
authority, a victim's right to recover is more limited under this act than under prior law.
57. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975); rehearing 88 N.M. "
544 P.2d 1158 (1976).
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doctrine of sovereign immunity. The case arose prior to passage of
the Public Officers and Employees Liability Act, but the Court noted
its enactment. In a suit to recover damages for the wrongful death of
plaintiffs wife and daughter allegedly due to the highway department's negligence, the district court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The highway department carried no liability insurance. The Supreme Court reversed the
district court's order.
The court said that sovereign immunity is a judicially created
principle which can be abolished by the courts; adequate insurance
can be purchased to eliminate any intolerable financial burden on the
state; placing the burden on the state which can distribute losses is
more just and equitable than forcing the individual who suffers the
injury to bear the burden alone. The principle that one may seek a
remedy for every substantial wrong is weightier than the protection
of the state in light of the availability of liability insurance.' I The
court overruled all cases recognizing governmental immunity from
tort liability and applied the new rule to the case at bar, all similar
pending actions, and all cases arising in the future. On motion for

rehearing, the court modified its ruling and ordered that the Hicks
decision apply only to torts occurring after July 1, 1976. Justice
McManus, speaking for himself and Justice Stephenson, based the
modification which deprived Hicks of the benefits of his day in court
on the injustice of depriving the state of a defense upon which it had
a right to rely.' 9 In his view, better policy would permit the state to
58. The court found substantial support for its position in abolishing sovereign immunity
in the opinion of Justice Roberts in Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305
A.2d 877 (1973). It is notable that the case, which involved the liability of a school district,
has not been so persuasive in Pennsylvania on the issue of sovereign immunity. It has been
read to result in, not the abolition of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania, but only in the
abolition of governmental immunity of political subdivisions. Where the state itself or one
of its agencies is the defendant, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, over Justice Robert's
dissents, has consistently affirmed dismissal of complaints on preliminary objections. See
,341 A.2d 481 (1975); Williams v. Pennsylvania
Pa.
Specter v. Commonwealth,
, 333 A.2d 924 (1975) appeal dismissed for want
Pa.
Dept. of Labor and Industry,
,96 Sup. Ct. 14 (1975); McCoy v.
U.S.
of substantial federal question,
Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 326 A.2d 396 (1974); Sweigard v. Penna. Dept. of Transp.
454 Pa. 32, 309 A.2d 374 (1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868
(1973); Bielio v. Penna. Liquor Control Board, 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973).
59. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1976). Courts have generally been sympathetic
to the view that the abolition of governmental immunity should have prospective effect to
permit governmental entities which have relied on the defense to purchase insurance to
cover the risks of their activities. As a rule, however, abrogation of the defense has been
given effect in the case at bar, because otherwise the announcement might be considered
mere dictum, and the plaintiffs would be deprived of any benefit from their efforts in
challenging the rule found to be obsolete. See, e.g., Merrill v. City of Manchester, 114 N.H.
722, 332 A.2d 378 (1974); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 838, 261 A.2d 896 (1970);
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plan for insurance and to develop procedures for investigating
accidents. Mr. Justice Oman agreed on the prospectivity point but
specially concurred because he did not agree that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity could or should be abolished by judicial
action. 6" Justices Montoya and Sosa dissented. They particularly
emphasized that the benefit of the abolition of the doctrine should
run to Hicks himself whose litigation efforts gave the court the
opportunity to abolish the doctrine. 6
THE TORT CLAIMS ACT OF 1976

Judicial abolition of sovereign immunity for torts occurring after
July 1, 1976, shifted the burden of policymaking to the legislature.
The legislature responded by enacting the Tort Claims Act, 6 2 which
repealed the Public Officers and Employees Liability Act and the Peace
Officers Liability Act.
The declaration of legislative purpose recognizes the unfair and
inequitable results which occur from strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.6 3 It justifies that inequity on grounds
that a private individual is free to choose not to engage in an activity
at all. It is, therefore, fair to charge an individual for liability,
presumably because he exercises his choice to act in consideration of
his exposure to that liability. If he chooses to act, it must be in
expectation of a benefit which in his judgment outweighs the cost of
his exposure to liability. The government, on the other hand, is
obliged to act for the public good: It cannot choose not to govern in
consideration of liability exposure. Thus, when it acts liability ought
not be imposed on it to the same extent as liability may be imposed
on an individual. The declaration suggests that governmental entities
have no discretion to refrain from an activity even in the face of a
finding that the public good is outweighed by the risk of public loss
occasioned by a possible liability judgment. The inference is that the
government lacks discretion to avoid public detriment. The legislature surely cannot have meant that. Indeed examination of the
statutory structure compels the conclusion that the purpose of the
act is to treat the State and other governmental entities differently
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). The purely prospective
abrogation of the defense to a date certain, announced on rehearing in Hicks has been
followed in Minnesota. See Nieting v. Blondell,
Minn.
,235 N.W.2d 597 (1975).
60. 88 N.M. at
,544 P.2d at 1159.
61. 88 N.M. at
,544 P.2d at 1160 and 1161.
62. Laws 1976, Ch. 58, § § 1 throguh 31; Tort Claims Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 5-14-1
through -19 (Spec. Supp. 1976); N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 5-14-20 through -23 (Spec. Supp.
1976).
63. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-14-2A (Spec. Supp. 1976).
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from individuals because to do otherwise threatens the public
treasuries too much. Even though the state is in a much better position to spread the loss than is the victim of a public employee's tort,
protection of the public treasuries to some extent justifies the partial retention of immunity.
The declaration of purpose further purports to abolish all judicially-created categories previously used to determine immunity or
liability 6 4 and says that liability under the Act will be based on
traditional negligence concepts and in no event on strict liability. It
attempts, however, to modify the common law standard of care by
including as factors to be considered in the determination of the
standard the financial limitations of the agency 65 as well as the
agency's discretion in determining the extent and nature of its
activities.
The pattern of the Act is relatively simple. It reinstates immunity
from tort liability for a governmental entity, 6 6 as well as for public
employees, 6 7 including law enforcement officers. 6 8 It then waives
64. Id. § 5-14-2B.
65. Id. One can only speculate on the sort of modification of the ordinary standard of
care that is intended by the legislature to run on the financial limitations of the
governmental entity. The usual jury instruction on ordinary care is that care which a
reasonably prudent person exercises in the management of his own affairs. "Ordinary care"
is not an absolute term, but a relative one. In deciding whether ordinary care has been
exercised, the conduct in question must be considered in light of all the surrounding
circumstances, as shown by the evidence. What constitutes "ordinary care" varies with the
nature of what is being done. As the danger that should reasonably be foreseen increases, so
the mount of care required also increases, N.M. Uniform Jury Instruction 12.2. The
financial capacity of a defendant is not usually a factor in the determination of ordinary
care. The legislative purpose would seem to permit a finding that ordinary care has been
exercised even in face of evidence that a governmental entity failed to use available and
customarily used safety devices if only the devices were costly in relation to the entity's
resources. No such consideration would be permitted a corporate or individual defendant.
66. Id. § 5-14-3A, B, and F.
A. "[G] overnmental entity" means the state or any local public body as
defined in subsections B and F of this section.
B. "[L] ocal public body" means all political subdivisions of the state and
their agencies, instrumentalities and institutions.
F. "[S] tate" or "state agency" means the state of New Mexico or any of
its branches, agencies, departments, boards, instrumentalities or institutions.
67. Id. § 5-14-3D.
"[P]ublic employee" means any officer, employee or servant of a governmental entity, including elected or appointed officials, law enforcement
officers, and persons acting on behalf or in service of a governmental entity in
any official capacity whether with or without compensation, but the term
does not include an independent contractor.
68. Id. § 5-14-3C.
"[Liaw enforcement officer" means any full-time salaried public employee of
a governmental entity whose principal duties under law are to hold in custody
any person accused of a criminal offense, to maintain public order, or to make
arrests for crimes, or members of the national guard when called to active duty
by the governor.
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immunity for both governmental entity and public employee for
particular acts set forth in Sections 5 through 12. Because the prefatory language of the Act abolishes the judicially-created distinctions between governmental and proprietary activities and
discretionary and ministerial acts, it is fair to assume that a
municipality whose employee is engaged in an activity formerly
considered proprietary is immune under the Act even though it
would not have been under prior law, unless the activity is specifically listed in Sections 5 through 12. Furthermore, even if the
complained of act of the employee is purely ministerial, he too will
be immunized from tort liability even though under the common law
he would have been personally liable, again unless his act fits within
the waiver. And the ultimate limitation on the waiver of immunity is
that, nowithstanding any other provision of the Tort Claims Act, the
liability assumed under the Act is limited to insured risks and the
amount of insurance coverage." 9 So, in any event, if the governmental entity fails to purchase insurance to cover the risk, both it
and its employee acting within the scope of his duties are immune.
If, however, insurance coverage is provided, neither the governmental entity nor the public employee is immune for bodily injury,
wrongful death or damage to property caused by:
Section 5 negligent operation of any motor vehicle, aircraft or
watercraft ;7 0
Section 6 negligent operation or maintenance of any building, public
park, machinery equipment or furnishings; 7
Section 7 negligent operation of airport unless the liability is due to a
condition arising out of a compliance with a federal or
state law or regulation governing the use and operation of
7
airports ; 2
Section 8 negligent operation of utilities, specifically, gas, electricity,
water, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, heating,
and ground transportation, but not including damages
caused either by a failure to provide an adequate supply or
from polluting the land, air, or water; 7 3
Section 9 negligent operation of any hospital or outpatient health
7
care facility ; 4
Section 10 negligent providing of health care if the public employee is
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 5-14-18.
§ 5-14-5.
§ 5-14-6.
§ 5-14-7.
§ 5-14-8.
§ 5-14-9.
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a doctor of medicine, doctor of7 osteopathy, chiropractor,
podiatrist or nurse anesthestist; 5
Section 11 negligent maintenance or operation of any bridge, culvert,
highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area,
but not including76liability for any plan or design defect in
any of the above;
Section 12 assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, of process, libel, slander, defamation of
character, violationof property rights or deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by federal and
New Mexico constitutions when caused by law
enforcement7 7officers while acting within the scope of
their duties.
The Section 12 waiver of immunity for law enforcement officers
seems to contain a significant drafting error. In both the Peace
Officers Liability Act and the Public Officers and Employees
Liability Act immunity was waived not only for bodily injury, sickness or disease occasioned by the tortious conduct of the employee
or officer, but also for personal injury that flows from such torts as
malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, libel, slander
and violation of civil rights.7 8 The kind of harm sustained when
these torts are committed is typically not bodily harm, but harm to
personal dignity, reputation, privacy and emotional tranquility. The
Tort Claims Act waives the immunity of the law enforcement officer
and the governmental entity only for bodily injury, wrongful death,
or damage to property. Unless the sort of personal harm flowing
from the dignitary torts listed in Section 12 can be fitted into either
the category of damage to property or bodily injury, it seems that
the officer and the governmental entity are immune even though the
invasion of personal interests is substantial. Because in other respects
Section 12 is simply a restatement of the provisions of the Peace
Officers Liability Act, it may be that the ommission was inadvertent.
If this is so, the oversight should be corrected by amendment.
The omission assumes even greater significance in light of two
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Paul v. Davis7 9 and Imbler v.
Pachtman.8 0 Paul involved a claim that libel published under color
of state law violated rights secured by the fourteenth amendment,
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 5-14-10.
Id. § 5-14-11.
Id. § 5-14-12.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-8-3E (1975 Supp.); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-13-4D (1975 Supp.).
,44 LW 4337 (1976).
U.S.
,96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
U.S.
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giving rise to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of
1871. The conduct complained of by the plaintiff was distribution of
a flyer by two chiefs of police which displayed plaintiff's picture and
name and described him as an "active shoplifter." In holding that
damage to reputation alone is neither deprivation of property nor
liberty protected by the due process clause and the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, Mr. Justice Rehnquist left the plaintiff to his state common
law action in libel for relief for his injury. In this precise situation, it
is possible that plaintiff has no claim under the present Tort Claims
Act in New Mexico, even if the governmental entity purchased insurance to cover the claim. Since Section 12 waives immunity only with
respect to bodily injury, wrongful death or damage to property,
plaintiff might be without remedy under either state or federal law
for damage to his reputation. In Imbler the Court held that malicious
prosecution by a state prosecuting attorney did not state a claim
redressable under § 1983. Section 12, as it now reads, could result in
immunity under state law as well.
Although the immunity of the public employee is waived for
conduct specifically set out in Sections 5 through 12, the governmental entity has a statutory duty to indemnify the employee 8'
unless the employee acted maliciously, fraudulently, or without
justifiable cause, and even then, if the conduct of the employee,
although malicious, fits within one of the categories set out in
Section 12.82 And in any event the governmental entity must provide a defense for the employee.8 3 Furthermore, a governmental
entity has no right to contribution, indemnity or subrogation against
a public employee.
The Act imposes maximum limits of liability of $100,000 for
property damage, $300,000 for other damages, and $500,000 aggregate damages from a single occurrence. 8 4 A government entity is
authorized, however, to purchase liability insurance coverage in
amounts up to $1,000,000, and if it does so the limits of liability are
extended to the actual amount of such coverage.
The Act retains the provision that liability is limited to insured
risks and the amount of insurance coverage in broad language,
"notwithstanding any other provision of the Tort Claims Act,
the
liability assumed under that act shall be limited to insured risks and
the amount of liability insurance."'8 It goes farther than prior legisla81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

N.M.
Id.
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

Stat. Ann. § 5-14-4D (Spec. Supp. 1976).
5-14-4C.
5-14-17.
5-14-18.
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tion, however, in requiring governmental entities to purchase and
maintain insurance coverage for the liabilities under the Act. Prior
legislation authorized the purchase of insurance. And the purchase of
insurance constituted a pro tanto waiver of immunity. The Act sets
forth those activities for which immunity does not apply, and the
duty is imposed on a governmental entity to make a good faith effort
at the earliest practical time to purchase and maintain reasonably
8
available insurance coverage in a competitive market. 6 Even if it is
determined that no competitive market exists, the governmental
entity is authorized to purchase insurance by negotiation so long as
the superintendent of insurance finds that rates are not unreasonably
86. Id. Whether this statutory language supports an action in mandamus if a governmental entity fails to purchase insurance is questionable. The Tort Claims Act itself
expressly provides that it shall not be construed to prohibit any proceedings for mandamus
(Section 15A), but it remains to be seen whether anyone is in a position to challenge
governmental inaction to provide insurance by means of a mandamus proceeding. The
mandamus statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 22-12-1 thorugh 22-12-14 (1953) sets out the requirements for challenging official lack of action. There must be no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law, the party seeking the writ must be beneficially interested, and the purpose of
the writ must be to compel performance of an official duty and not to control official
discretion. See Dumars & Browde, Mandamus in New Mexico, 4 N.M.L. Rev. 155 (1974) in
which the authors conclude that if there is no remedy in damages, or by appeal to a higher
court or administrative agency, there is no remedy in the ordinary course of law. If that
principle is applied to the immunity problem, it is clear that if the immunity of the
governmental entity persists because of its failure to purchase insurance, there is no remedy
other than mandamus. The authors also conclude that a broad standing rule is applied in
mandamus in New Mexico and a petitioner in mandamus acts like a private attorney-general
enforcing public rights. That would suggest that after July 1, 1976, any citizen of New
Mexico would have sufficient interest to seek mandamus to compel governmental entities to
purchase insurance. Since governmental activities are so widespread that they create risks of
injury to large numbers of persons, the waiver of the immunity of governmental entities
from suit is a matter of wide public interest and should be enforceable at the instance of any
member of the public. For the current New Mexico law of standing see Walden, Civil
. The major theoretical roadblock to the mandamus proceeding is
Procedure, infra at
the nature of the duty imposed by the language "good faith effort to purchase and maintain
insurance coverage ... to the extent such coverage may be reasonably available in a competitive market. Ordinarily mandamus will not lie to correct or control the discretion or
judgment of a public officer, but only to compel the performance of a clear legal duty. The
qualifying language in the act might be read to mean that the insurance purchasing decision
is discretionary. However in Conston v. New Mexico State Board of Probation and Parole,
79 N.M. 385, 444 P.2d 296 (1968), the court recognized that while revocation of parole
rests within the discretion of the Parole Board and is unreviewable, nevertheless mandamus
is available to assure that the Board in revoking parole complies with the relevant statutory
provisions. It would seem that mandamus would similarly be available to permit petitioner
to show that insurance was reasonably available. There remains, however, a considerable
practical problem. The person with the greatest motivation to challenge governmental
inaction in purchasing insurance is the victim of governmental torts. Even a successful
mandamus proceeding will not result in the availability of insurance to cover his injury,
which would necessarily have arisen before insurance was obtained. So if mandamus is
available, the measure of damages should properly include the recovery he would have had,
had the governmental entity not been immune. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-12 (1953).
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high.8 7 The Act permits avoidance of the duty to purchase
insurance, and thus full immunity, in the event rates of coverage are
found to be "unreasonably high." 8 8
Even though an affirmative duty to purchase liability insurance
reasonably available in a competitive market is imposed alike on all
governmental entities, a considerable problem arises because of the
varying scope of the duty depending on the financial resources of the
governmental entity. If reasonable availability takes into account the
financial resources of the governmental entity as compared to the
cost of insurance, that which may be reasonably available to Bernalillo County, for example, may not be reasonably available to Mora
County because of the differences in the financial base in the two
counties. That problem is exacerbated because the Act provides
funds for purchase of insurance for the state and state agencies but
not for purchase of insurance for local public bodies.8
A risk
management division is established, the chief of which must be
knowledgeable in insurance, which has responsiblity to acquire and
administer insurance purchased by the state. 9 0 No counterpart provision exists for local public bodies. The only administrative assistance provided local public bodies is the duty imposed on the chief
of the risk management division to consult with them.9" The Act
places the state and state agencies in a better position to purchase
insurance than are local public bodies and thus exaggerates the
inequalities that already exist between the financial base of the state
and of some local public bodies. And so long as there is no liability
insurance to cover the risks specified in the Act, the relevant governmental entity and its public employees are wholly immune from suit.
Whether or not the doctrine of sovereign immunity itself conflicts
with the guarantee of equal protection provided by the U.S. and New
Mexico Constitutions is a question which is presently unsettled. 9 2 A
statute such as the Tort Claims Act, which may result in immunity of
relatively poor governmental entities and waiver of immunity for
relatively wealthy units, increases the arbitrariness of the classification of victims of government tort. The availability of a remedy to a
tort victim turns not on the arguably substantive differences between
87. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-14-18 (Spec. Supp. 1976).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 5-14-20.
90. Id. § 5-14-21.
91. Id. § 5-14-23. Except for home rule municipalities and municipalities with a population of over ten thousand, insurance policies purchased by local public bodies must be
approved by the chief of the risk management division and the superintendent of insurance
to insure compliance with the Tort Claims Act.
92. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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a governmental entity and a private tortfeasor, but on the relative
9
Furthermore, provision of a
wealth of the governmental entity.
and the absence of such a
state
the
for
fund to purchase insurance
increases the natural
bodies
public
local
aid
to
funding mechanism
public bodies; thus
local
and
state
the
disparity in wealth between
inequalities.
creates
affirmatively
the Tort Claims Act
CONCLUSION
After a history of carving out exceptions to the general application
of sovereign immunity, the legislature had the opportunity after
Hicks v. State to reevaluate fully the policy governing the liability of
the government and its employees to persons injured by the conduct
of public employees. The legislature responded to that challenge by
generally reinstating immunity of governmental entities and public
employees. It might have instead produced a policy that recognizes
that governmental entities are better able to bear and distribute
losses than is the injured victim of governmental tort. While eliminating the uncertainties and inequities of judicially-created categories,
the legislature has produced new artificial categories, thus inviting
litigation prolonged by argument about whether an activity is
included within the categories. 9" It has spelled out a duty to pur93. The Kansas history is instructive. Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969),
was a negligence action for personal injuries against the members of the Board of Regents of
Kansas. Trial court granted a motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. In
reversing, the Kansas Supreme Court abolished state immunity for negligence when the state
or its agencies were engaged in proprietary activities, but recognized the authority of the
legislature to control the entire field of immunity including that part covered by the court's
opinion. The legislative response to the court's invitation in Carroll to develop rational
immunity policy was to reinstate the governmental immunity of the state and its boards,
commissions, departments, agencies and institutions for implied contract, negligence, or any
other tort. K.S.A. 46-901 and to reaffirm the common law liability of local units of government. K.S.A. 46-902 [L. 1970 ch. 200 § 21. In Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 217 Kan.
279, 540 P.2d 66 (1975), the Supreme Court of Kansas found that legislative response to
conflict with the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Kansas
Constitution, because the particular classification lacked a reasonable and proper basis. The
New Mexico Supreme Court has recently expressed its willingness to inquire into whether
classifications in a statute are reasonable and rest on some grounds of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the objects of the legislation. See McGeehan v. Bunch, 88
N.M. 308, 549 P.2d 238 (1975), where the automobile guest statute was found void as a
denial of equal protection.
94. Consider, for example, the opportunities for dispute provided by Section 11 of the
Act. It waives immunity for negligent operation or maintenance of any street, but not for
defect in plan or design. Suppose a stop sign which previously governed traffic at a busy
intersection is knocked down. It is not replaced because the city engineer deems it unnecessary. Plaintiff is injured arguably as the result of driver's negligence and the concurrent lack
of a stop sign. If the city engineer's conduct is characterized as negligent maintenance and
the city has insurance, the city is not immune. If it is, on the other hand, a defect in plan or
design, the city is immune, even if it has insurance.
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chase insurance that varies from governmental entity to governmental entity which is an obvious invitation to equal protection
challenge.
The Act may be, however, little more than a holding action. The
delayed repeal provision 9 causes the Act to be effective only until
July 1, 1978. By that time, the extent to which the problems
inherent in the Act are either fulfilled or solved in its implementation
will be apparent. Informed by that experience and aided by clarifying litigation, the legislature's next attempt at establishing New
Mexico's policy on sovereign and governmental immunity may come
closer to recognizing the loss distributing capacities of governmental
entities.9 6
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-14-3 (Spec. Supp. 1976).
96. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 2674, 2675, 2680, might be a point of
departure.
2674. Liability of United States. The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.
2675. Disposition by federal agency as prerequisite -Evidence.
(a) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States
for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal
agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing
and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final
disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of
the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for
purposes of this section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
such claims as may be asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
[Rules, part 1 by third party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim.
(b) Action under this section shall not be instituted for any sum in excess
of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the
increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably
discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon
allegation and proof of intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim.
(c) Disposition of any claim by the Attorney General or other head of a
federal agency shall not be competent evidence of liability or amount of
damages.
2680. Exception. The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this
title shall not apply to(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Since sovereign immunity has been abolished by Hicks v. State, the legislature would have to
reinstate immunity for governmental entities and officers and then follow the federal
pattern.

